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THE POWER ELITE
Nicole Sackley
Inderjeet Parmar. Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, 
and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012. ix + 356 pp. Notes and index. $40.00.
In February 1941, influential Time-Life publisher Henry Luce prevailed upon 
his fellow Americans to “create the first great American century” by embrac-
ing what he imagined to be America’s destiny as the leader of nations. By the 
close of the Second World War, Luce’s vision of a Pax Americana had come 
to fruition: the United States dominated the globe in economic, cultural, and 
military terms. U.S. foreign policy revolved, and in many respects continues to 
revolve, around maintaining that dominance. The “American Century” might 
also be termed the philanthropists’ century. Beginning in the 1930s, the larg-
est U.S. foundations—the Carnegie Corporation of New York (founded 1911), 
the Rockefeller Foundation (1913), and the Ford Foundation (1936)—initiated 
and expanded the reach of their international activities and ambitions. They 
opened field offices and sponsored a vast array of projects on nearly every 
continent, from Soviet expertise at Harvard to agricultural science in India. 
The Ford Foundation, the most ambitious and wealthiest of the “Big Three,” 
encapsulated the breadth of philanthropic internationalism when it declared 
that its mission was nothing short of the “advancement of human welfare.”
Over the past decade, scholars have begun to write the international history 
of the foundations. Influenced by the transnational turn in U.S. history as well 
as growing interdisciplinary interest in the role of non-state actors on the world 
stage, scholars such as Sunil Amrith, Volker Berghahn, Mary Brown Bullock, 
Anne-Emmanuelle Birn, Matthew Connelly, David Ekbladh, David Engerman, 
and John Krige have treated U.S. foundations as important international play-
ers. Some of these scholars have focused on foundations’ efforts in particular 
regions or nations. Others have shown how Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford 
helped to construct new global problems (underdevelopment, hunger, popula-
tion control) as well as the transnational networks through which particular 
approaches to those problems emerged and came to dominate international 
practice. All of the new work has been grounded in close analysis of founda-
tion records. What we have lacked is a full accounting of the evolution of the 
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U.S. foundations’ ideologies and international grant-making in the context 
of a changing world order and of particular conditions in the field. We also 
need a study that looks closely at the relationship between foundations and 
the state over the course of the twentieth century. 
In both respects, Inderjeet Parmar’s new book addresses critical lacunae 
in our understanding of the foundations. One wishes it were more successful 
at filling them. Foundations of the American Century examines the efforts by 
the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations to shape and support U.S. 
foreign policy from the 1930s through the “war on terror.” Parmar makes 
three claims about the foundations’ relationship to U.S. foreign policy. First, 
the largest foundations were, and remain, central players in a hegemonic 
and homogenous East Coast foreign policy establishment. Second, the foun-
dations played a critical role in moving elite U.S. public opinion away from 
isolationism and toward internationalism in the 1930s and 1940s. Finally, elite 
transnational knowledge networks were the foundations’ key contribution 
to building a postwar “American imperium” (p. 2). Founded and fostered 
with foundation largesse, these networks served to incorporate and co-opt 
European and third-world elites into U.S. foreign policymakers’ worldview.
Parmar is a political scientist, one who is particularly interested in the 
relationship between non-state actors and state power. The first chapter of 
Foundations of the American Century characterizes and compares “mainstream” 
scholarship on the foundations to Parmar’s own theoretical framework. Parmar 
depicts a dominant scholarly narrative in which the foundations are charac-
terized as wholly benign, objective, and selfless forces in the international 
arena—“above politics and ideology, beyond big business and the state, and 
part of a third sector above and independent of both” (p. 24). To Parmar, this 
is a “fiction” (p. 5) easily refuted by ample evidence that, in fact, the foun-
dations belong to, and reliably serve, “the power elite of the United States” 
(p. 2). The social and economic connections of foundation leaders, as well as 
their grant-making activity, reveal them to be “steeped in market, corporate, 
and state institutions” (p. 2) and dedicated to “the ideology of Americanism 
as liberal internationalism” (p..5). Their principal modus operandi has been the 
“cultural and intellectual penetration” (p. 2) of global leaders and intellectuals 
through the construction of social fields that reproduce the ideologies, habits, 
and practices of the American power elite. While Parmar acknowledges his 
intellectual debts to C. Wright Mills, Manuel Castells, and Pierre Bourdieu, it 
is Antonio Gramsci and “neo-Gramscian” understandings of hegemony and 
intellectual production that anchor his analysis.
Parmar’s use of Bourdieu and Gramsci is a welcome addition to the his-
torical analysis of the foundations. Concepts like hegemony, knowledge net-
works, and social fields help to illuminate how and why foundation leaders 
and grantees acted and operated in the ways that they did. Yet in deploying 
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these concepts, Parmar assumes that the current literature has been wholly 
untouched by theoretical considerations or critical analysis. He repeatedly 
groups scholarly accounts with encomiums by foundations’ insiders, and uses 
one article—published over twenty-five years ago by Barry Karl and Stanley 
Katz—as evidence for the lack of a critical perspective from “mainstream” 
scholars. Missing from Parmar’s analysis, and, indeed, from his bibliography, 
are dozens of articles, monographs, and dissertations from the past decade 
that draw on foundation records to grapple with philanthropic power and 
influence. Juxtaposing his work with an intellectual straw man, Parmar also 
leaves little room for the possibility that historical experience might, at times, 
deviate from theoretical predictions and, in doing so, inform our understand-
ings of how power, class, and ideology operate. The form and tone of the 
opening chapter suggest that history will be marshaled in the rest of the book, 
less to understand human experience and change over time than to indict the 
foundations for sustaining U.S. hegemony.
Parmar moves on in chapter two to demonstrate how foundation lead-
ers form an essential component of the U.S. power elite. The first half of the 
chapter is given over to biographical sketches of Andrew Carnegie, John D. 
Rockefeller (senior and junior), and Henry Ford. Historians with a passing 
knowledge of these well-known figures will find nothing new here. The sec-
tion is based almost entirely on secondary sources, which Parmar has a habit 
of quoting directly. To explain the social context in which the Carnegie and 
Rockefeller foundations were established, Parmar ignores newer scholarship 
emphasizing the imperial and transatlantic sources of American reform ideas 
and practices. Instead, Richard Hofstadter’s “psychic crisis of the 1890s” does 
the explanatory work for why very wealthy men turned to philanthropy in the 
early decades of the twentieth century (p. 39). The rest of the chapter builds 
a collective socioeconomic portrait of the Rockefeller and Carnegie boards of 
trustees during the 1930s and 1940s. This material amply demonstrates that 
trustees inhabited the same small world of Ivy League schools, white-shoe law 
firms, and corporate directorships as U.S. foreign policymakers. (Indeed, there 
existed something of a revolving door between top foundation and official 
posts.) Yet this is hardly a new finding: Robert Arnove and Edward Berman 
drew similar conclusions over thirty years ago. Historians now begin with the 
assumption that, at midcentury, foundation leaders and foreign policy elites 
shared a set of assumptions about the imperatives of liberal internationalism, 
market capitalism, and elite knowledge and stewardship.
One wishes that Parmar might have used his extensive reading in foundation 
records to demonstrate how social background and elite networks shaped the 
making of foundation policy and projects. One could imagine, for example, 
an exploration of the social networks of a foundation president like Carnegie’s 
Frederick Keppel or an influential trustee like Ford’s John Cowles. The rise of 
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the Ford Foundation and its creation of a vast bureaucracy of foundation officers 
in New York—Keppel dubbed them “philanthropoids”—also raise important 
questions. To what extent did these officers share the same backgrounds and 
priorities as foundation leaders? To what degree did their screening and day-
to-day management of grants shape foundation policies? Were there frictions or 
debates within foundations or between foundations about the ends or means of 
philanthropic goals? Rather than explore such questions, Parmar extrapolates 
from biographical schematics from the first half of the twentieth century to 
conclude that little has changed in the last seventy years. Foundation leaders 
remain “hardwired” to a “firm, indeed, unshakeable attachment to American 
global leadership” and an “American system of values—free enterprise, indi-
vidualism, limited government” (p. 58). 
The rest of the book presents a series of case studies demonstrating how 
foundation leaders promulgated this worldview both within the United States 
and around the world. The most original of these, chapter three, explores the 
efforts of the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations to promote U.S. globalism 
prior to World War II. Parmar is at his best when he describes foundation-
sponsored projects to undermine domestic isolationist sentiment. Through 
careful primary research, he reveals how elite U.S. universities and think tanks 
drew upon the emerging fields of public opinion research and management to 
“re-educate” African Americans, labor leaders, college students, and small-town 
leaders. Parmar also has several useful pages on foundation support for British 
social science and foreign policy think tanks. Here, we see the foundations at 
work building the networks that help sustain the Anglo-American alliance. 
Other sections describe the foundations’ early support for the realist para-
digm that came to dominate both the academic field of International Relations 
and postwar U.S. national security policy. While this is an important corrective 
to the view that realist ideas emerged only in the wake of the Cold War, one 
wishes that Parmar had examined how this interwar transformation occurred. 
Parmar writes as if the foundations locked into a monolithic vision of globalism 
that remained virtually unchanged from 1930 onward. Yet, this was an era of 
disorienting geopolitical crises and passionate intellectual contests. Without 
some attention to how philanthropic leaders responded to the rise of Hitler 
or social scientific debates over the role of the state, one has little sense of 
how older ideas lost purchase and new ones took hold. There are places as 
well, where, in the interest of underlining a point, Parmar omits details that 
would have brought nuance to his arguments without undermining them. 
Noting that Yale political scientist Nicholas J. Spykman, the “godfather of 
containment,” was born in Holland and lived in Cairo and Java before taking 
his Ph.D. at Berkeley, for example, complicates the picture of a uniform East 
Coast establishment. 
125SACKLEY  /  The Power Elite
The next four chapters move forward in time, illustrating how the founda-
tions built transnational knowledge networks during the Cold War. Chapter 
four focuses on foundation grants to shape foreign intellectuals’ vision of the 
“American way of life” through the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, 
the Henry Kissinger–led Harvard Summer Seminar, the British Association 
for American Studies, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Parmar does 
particularly good work bringing to life the details of the Salzburg and Harvard 
programs and the voices of foreign intellectuals and leaders who participated 
in them. Here, in illuminating the emphasis on candid exchange and criticism, 
he nicely demonstrates the subtle but powerful mechanisms of intellectual 
hegemony.
Chapters five, six, and seven turn to the broad project of economic develop-
ment. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Big Three foundations supported 
elite U.S. university projects in area studies, area studies associations, and the 
training of social scientists (largely economists) in the third world. Parmar’s 
ambition to document the global sweep of foundation activity in this field 
is admirable. But in attempting to recount so many stories, Foundation of the 
American Century spreads itself thin. The sections on U.S.–based Asian, African, 
and Latin American studies offer some useful new details, particularly on the 
construction of African Studies as a field, but historians of the social sciences 
have already covered much of this material. 
When Parmar leaves the United States, his story becomes one of the export 
and imposition of American models abroad. Parmar is right to highlight the 
unequal nature of these intellectual “exchanges.” U.S. philanthropies used 
their vast resources to pick and choose which development visions received 
support. Yet, in attempting to inscribe their visions onto other nations, U.S. 
foundations and the American academics they sponsored never encountered 
a simple tabula rasa in the field. Foreign leaders and intellectuals came to the 
development project with their own histories and agendas. Parmar’s account 
would have been greatly strengthened had he delved into local histories in his 
three case studies of Indonesia, Nigeria, and Chile or explored the perspectives 
of third-world scholars who participated in foundation-sponsored projects. It 
would have been illuminating, too, to learn something about how foundation 
officers operated on the ground. Foundation officials are mentioned without 
clear explanation of who they were or how they built networks. Frank Miller, 
the Ford Foundation’s representative in Jakarta in the 1960s, for example, is 
introduced as “Miller” and conflated in the book’s index with Frances Pickens 
Miller, a leading figure in the interwar Council on Foreign Relations. Such a 
mistake would be minor if it were not emblematic of Parmar’s relative disinter-
est in the contexts and contingencies under which the foundations operated.
There are hints in these chapters that the cultural ferment and economic 
crises of the late 1960s and early 1970s ruffled the smooth application of 
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philanthropic globalism. In a fascinating section, Parmar depicts shock and 
“soul searching” within the Ford Foundation after the military coup in Chile 
in 1973. Ford had sunk over a decade of investment into building a network 
of center-left economists; the coup ushered into power the “Chicago Boys,” 
Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago in new neoliberal 
visions of economic policy. As the economists whom Ford supported became 
targets of political repression under the new regime, the foundation leadership 
scrambled to find them academic posts abroad. Parmar interprets this as an 
effort to preserve its elite network. One might also, however, see the Chilean 
example as a moment of transformation in the international economic order, 
one in which the Ford Foundation and other U.S. major philanthropies found 
themselves as the standard bearers of an older paradigm—state-led capitalist 
planning—under attack from left and right. There is little in Foundations of the 
American Century to acknowledge that, in the 1970s and 1980s, a new genera-
tion of corporate leaders, neoconservative politicians, intellectuals, and free 
market economists spurned the Big Three foundations as ideologically out of 
step with new free market orthodoxies. 
Did the foundations recalibrate their politics for new political times? Or, have 
there been real, simmering ideological disputes within the U.S. foreign policy 
elite since the 1970s? In his final chapter, Parmar skips over the 1970s and 1980s 
to describe some post–Cold War and post–9/11 foundation initiatives, from 
democratic peace theory to a “World Social Forum” to discuss alternatives to 
current globalization patterns. Once again, Parmar reads foundation projects 
as efforts to co-opt genuine challenges to U.S. power around the globe. Indeed, 
he argues, little has changed since the 1940s. The foundations maintain the 
same methods—network building—in service to a stable goal of “capitalist 
globalization.” This emphasis on continuity comes at a cost. Telling the history 
of the powerful means recognizing not only broad continuities across time, 
but also tensions, fissures, and moments of possibility and change. Scholars 
must name power, but we must also describe it. It is no use to essentialize the 
powerful in ways we would never accept for the powerless.
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